Transferência de risco em contratos internacionais de compra e venda: periculum est emptoris e as regras da Convenção das Nações Unidas para os contratos de compra e venda de mercadorias (CISG). (RI §428254)
Transfer of risk in international contracts of sale: periculum est emptoris and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) rules -
João Costa-Neto y Rodrigo Olímpio Botelho Rocha
Este artigo aborda a transferência de risco em contratos internacionais de compra e venda, de acordo com as regras da Convenção das Nações Unidas para os contratos de compra e venda de mercadorias (CISG). Discute como a CISG estabelece regras para a transferência de risco entre vendedor e comprador, visando a reduzir incertezas e conflitos. Estabelece paralelos entre as regras da Convenção e de Direito Romano no que envolve a transferência de risco em con-tratos de compra e venda. Dá-se especial foco à função das regras em ambos os sistemas. São exploradas as semelhanças entre os requisitos para a transferência de risco ao comprador e casos em que o comprador é liberado da obrigação de pagar o preço da coisa perecida.
This article addresses the transfer of risk in international sales contracts, according to the rules of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). It discus-ses how the CISG establishes rules for the transfer of risk between seller and buyer, aiming to reduce uncertainties and conflicts. It also draws parallels between the Convention's rules and Roman Law regarding the transfer of risk in sales contracts. The article places special focus on the function of the rules in both systems and explores the similarities between the requirements for transferring risk to the buyer and cases in which the buyer is released from the obligation to pay for goods that have perished.
1. Introdução. 2. Contexto histórico. Regras de transferência de risco em contratos de compra e venda. 3. Regras da CISG sobre a transferência de risco. 4. Comparação entre a CISG e o peri-culum est emptoris. 5. Conclusões. 6. Referências.
This study analyzes the relationship between artificial intelligence (AI) and humans in formalized discretionary administrative decision making. It shows how the undue elimination of discretionary powers (fettering), in the case of rule-based AI, and certain characteristics that are for the moment only human (empathy and abductive reasoning), in the case of non-symbolic or statistical AI (automatic and deep learning) pose a legal impediment to the fully automated exercise of discretion by machines. They should not make volitional judgments, as this would violate the right to good administration, the due administrative procedure and the duty of giving reasons, a corollary of the latter. It is suggested that this legal prohibition be made explicit in Spain, as has already been done in some rules of comparative and regional law, in accordance with the current state of the art and the legal principle of precaution, without prejudice to the fact that AI can be used to support the human decision-maker in making discretionary decisions. In the case of AI exercising regulated powers, or allowing the exercise of discretion, which is rejected here, the need (and difficulty) of supervising the operation of AI by a human public manager, responsible for the administrative procedure and/or the final decision, is emphasized. The analysis ends with the conclusions reached and with the need to reflect on how to develop human supervision and to configure it as an authentic subjective right of the interested parties.