The position of the shareholders within the german StaRUG. (RI §425609)  

Palabras clave: German StaRUG; restructuring plan; cross-class cramdown; shareholders; absolute priority rule.;

On 1 January 2021 the new German Act on the Stabilisation and Restructuring Framework for Businesses (StaRUG) came into force, which transposes the EU Restructuring Directive (2019/1023) into German law. The StaRUG has been long-awaited as it closes the gap in the German restructuring practice between out-of-court consensual restructuring and restructuring in in-court insolvency proceedings providing, inter alia, the instrument of a restructuring plan including a powerful cross-class cramdown mechanism. The instrument is in Germany in principle well known from the insolvency plan proceeding allowing to overcome obstructing minority creditors. This leads to the question which position the shareholders hold within the StaRUG framework and to which extent they can obstruct the restructuring plan.

I. INTRODUCTION. II. THE GERMAN STARUG-SCHEME. 1. Plan offer and initiation of the StaRUG court procedure by the debtor. 2. Scope of the StaRUG restructuring plan: selection of affected parties and legal relationship subject to the plan. 3. Formation of classes and equal treatment. 4. Adoption of plan by majority vote in all classes – Voting rights. 5. Adoption of plan by majority vote across classes – Cross-class cram-down. 5.1. Majority of voting classes, section 26 (1) no 3 StaRUG. 5.2. No worse off, section 26 (1) no 1 StaRUG. 5.3. Fair share in the plan value, section 26 (1) no 2, 27 (1) and (2) StaRUG. 5.3.1. General rule for all classes, section 27 (1) StaRUG. 5.3.2. Specific rule for classes of persons holding an equity interest in the debtor, section 27 (2) StaRUG. III. RISK OF “HOLDOUT” BY SHAREHOLDERS. 1. Limited influence in the StaRUG plan procedure. 2. Factual “holdout” risks not approving to initiate the StaRUG procedure. IV. DISCUSSION REGARDING DIRECTORS’ DUTIES. V. BIBLIOGRAPHY.