THE “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” PRINCIPLE IN SOUTH AMERICA AFTER THE ADVISORY OPINION “OC-17/2002”. TWO CASE STUDIES

Por

VINCENZO LORUBBIO

Junior Research Fellow

Centro di Ricerca Euro-Americano sulle Politiche costituzionali

Università del Salento

[email protected]

Revista General de Derecho Público Comparado 24 (2018)

ABSTRACT: The principle of the “Best Interests of the Child” began to find enforcement in the Latin-American context mostly after the introduction of the ‘Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002’ of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, solicited by Inter-American Commission about the ‘Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child’. Since 2002, there was a gradual acceptance both WHO in the domestic regulations and jurisprudence of most of the South-American countries. However, taking as reference the Brazilian and Argentine contexts, I will try to verify if identical formulas “Interés superior del niño” – “Melhor Interesse da Criança” also express identical meanings, or if behind stereotyped expression it’s possible to discover differences about reference criteria and mode of use of this controversial principle. Thanks to the juridical comparison, it will be possible to understand whether and to what extent the characteristic of the “Best Interests of the Child” developed on the domestic level reflect the legal guidance coming from the Jurisprudence of Inter-American Court.

KEYWORDS: Best interests of the child, Children and Adolescent Rights, Jurisprudence of Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Jurisprudential Dialogue, Domestic Implementation.

SUMMARY: I. PREMISE. – II. CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN JURIDICAL SYSTEM. – II.1. “O melhor interesse da Criança” in the Jurisprudence of the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (TSJ). – III. CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN THE ARGENTINE JURIDICAL SYSTEM. – III.1. The “Interés superior del niño” In the Jurisprudence of the “Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación Argentina”. – III.2. “Interés Superior del niño” and right to be heard between knowledge of origins and criminal responsibility. – IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC COURTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. – V. CHILDREN RIGHTS IN LATIN-AMERICAN AND THE CONTROL OF CONVENTIONALITY.

EL PRINCIPIO DEL INTERÉS SUPERIOR DEL NIÑO EN AMÉRICA LATINA TRÁS LA OPINIÓN CONSULTIVA 17/2002. DOS CASOS DE ESTUDIO

RESUMEN: El principio del “Interés superior del niño” comenzó a aplicarse en el contexto latinoamericano principalmente después de la introducción de la “Opinión Consultiva OC-17/2002” de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, solicitada por la Comisión Interamericana sobre la ‘Condición Jurídica y los Derechos Humanos del Niño’. Desde 2002, hubo una aceptación gradual tanto de la OMS en las regulaciones domésticas como en la jurisprudencia de la mayoría de los países sudamericanos. Sin embargo, tomando como referencia los contextos brasileño y argentino, trataré de verificar si las fórmulas idénticas “Interés superior del niño” – “Melhor Interesse da Criança” también expresan significados idénticos, o si detrás de la expresión estereotipada es posible descubrir diferencias sobre los criterios de referencia y modo de uso de este controvertido principio. Gracias a la comparación jurídica, será posible entender si la característica del “Interés superior del niño” desarrollada en el ámbito doméstico refleja y en qué medida refleja la orientación legal proveniente de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana.

PALABRAS CLAVE: El interés superior del niño; Los derechos de los niños y adolescentes; Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos; Diálogo jurisprudencial; tutela jurisdiccional efectiva.

SUMARIO: I. PREMISA. – II. NIÑOS Y ADOLESCENTES EN EL SISTEMA JURÍDICO BRASILEÑO. – II.1. “O MELHOR INTERESSE DA CRIANÇA” EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA DEL SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA (TSJ). – III. NIÑOS Y ADOLESCENTES EN EL SISTEMA JURÍDICO ARGENTINO. – III.1. El “interés superior del niño” en la jurisprudencia de la “Corte Suprema de Justicia de la nación argentina”. – III.2. “Interés superior del niño” y derecho a ser escuchado entre conocimiento de orígenes y responsabilidad penal. – IV. LA RELACIÓN ENTRE LOS TRIBUNALES NACIONALES Y EL TRIBUNAL INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS. – V. LOS DERECHOS DE LOS NIÑOS EN LATINOAMÉRICA Y EL CONTROL DE LA CONVENCIONALIDAD.

Fecha recepción: 19/11/2018

Fecha aceptación: 05/12/2018

I. PREMISE

The purpose of this study is to determine if and how, the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, concerning children’s rights, have influenced the legal systems of those American Countries that are subject to its jurisdiction, having ratified the American Convention of Human Rights.

First of all, therefore, I will evaluate without claiming to be exhaustive, the impact on domestic legal systems of the pronunciations of the Court of San José, in relation to the protection of the rights of the children: my work will be to assess whether the criteria used in this sector by domestic courts are the same or differ from those used by the Inter-American Court of human rights.

However, because of the vastness and heterogeneity of the legal structure of the 25 States members of the Convention, I decided to focus mainly on two Countries, Brazil and Argentina, which besides being the most representative countries in South America, have an internal situation that can be defined as highly paradigmatic of the current legal framework of the whole Latin-American reality.

II. CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN THE BRAZILIAN JURIDICAL SYSTEM

The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (“Constituição de 1988 da República Federativa do Brasil”, henceforth CF(1)), dedicates an entire chapter to the “Family”: more precisely the “Capítulo VI” of the CF, as amended by Amendment constitutional No. 65/2010, is entitled ““Da Família, da Criança, do Adolescente, do Jovem e do Idoso” “and it consists of 5 articles (226-230).

The greatest advantage of the Brazilian Constitution regarding the protection of children’s rights, was to put an end, at least in theory, to a tradition focused on the so-called doctrine of “Situação Irregular” based on the previous Juvenile Code (Law 6697/79), which tolerates reprehensible violations of the rights of children and adolescents: under this code, for example, minor offenders were permanently removed from society to be segregated in prisons called FEBEM, in which there was no respect for the dignity of the human being.

The historical context which formed the backdrop to the doctrine of the irregular situation involved numerous minors who made use of “street crime” to protect their lives and those of their families as a response to the extreme social inequality spread in the early 20th century: in this context, the relevant legislation was not based on the protection of minors, on the contrary, it was aimed only to ensure legal interventions whenever there was a risk of crime by minors. Therefore, the Juvenile legislation concerned only already happened situations of conflict and did not operate in terms of prevention: ultimately children were not treated as subjects of rights, but as mere objects of legal action(2).

However, with the introduction of the Constitution, there was a clear stance in favour of the minors: in art. 227 of CF it is stated that:

É dever da família, da sociedade e do Estado assegurar à criança, ao adolescente e ao jovem, com absoluta prioridade, o direito à vida, à saúde, à alimentação, à educação, ao lazer, à profissionalização, à cultura, à dignidade, ao respeito, à liberdade e à convivência familiar e comunitária, além de colocá-los a salvo de toda forma de negligência, discriminação, exploração, violência, crueldade e opressão(3).

But the real turn occurred two years later, when on 13th July 1990 the “Lei N º 8,069” was promulgated, known as “Estatuto da Criança e do adolescente”, sprung from the Convention the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and entirely inspired by the doctrine of “Proteção Integral”, which gained strength and consent in the international and national debates because it ensured more protection and rights to children and adolescents(4).

Thanks to this new Code, at least from a theoretical point of view, minors have ceased to be victims of the system of social inequality and have acquired a special legal status, which considers their particular nature of being developing humans that is not yet having full awareness of their rights, and not being able to achieve their personal realization without the support of the family, society or the State(5).

In addition, the Statute makes a significant and innovative differentiation, distinguishing between “kids” and “adolescents” (and even considering a third category, defined “young”): in fact, according to the Legislator there’s no generic category of “minor”, but it is necessary to distinguish children who are included in the age range between zero and 12 years, from adolescents who are included in the age range between twelve and eighteen years of age(6) as both conditions are marked by different needs.

Finally, to understand the basic idea underlying the new Statute it is necessary to analyse Art. 3 in depth, in which it is stated that:

“A criança e o adolescente gozam de todos os direitos fundamentais inerentes à pessoa humana, sem prejuízo da proteção integral de que trata esta Lei, assegurando-se-lhes, por lei ou por outros meios, todas as oportunidades e facilidades, a fim de lhes facultar o desenvolvimento físico, mental, moral, espiritual e social, em condições de liberdade e de dignidade”(7).

For completeness, it should be noted that some references to minors can be found both within the Civil Code and in the Criminal Code: more specifically, Article 3 of the Codigo Civil (as amended by the LEI No. 10,406 of 2002) says that “minors under sixteen are absolutely unable to act personally”(8) ... and Article 27 of the Codigo Penal says that minors of eighteen years are punishable by law but are subject to rules established by special legislation(9).

II.1. “O melhor interesse da criança” in the Jurisprudence of the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (TSJ)

After this brief but essential recognition of the child’s position within the Brazilian legal system, it will be useful to verify in what contexts Brazilian Judges (and in particular the judges of legitimacy) refer to the principle of the Best Interests of the Child, and if its characteristics coincide with those expressed in the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

In doctrine, it was observed that in its extensive national case-law, the Superior Court of Justice (TSJ)(10) has been very prompt in acknowledging that in cases involving minors the interests of the latters should always prevail over those of the other parties in the specific cases(11).

In fact, in order to resolve recent law cases involving children, the Brazilian TSJ has adopted the same basic principles of conventional law, in particular those relating to the pursuit of the best interests of the child: this principle is mainly used in cases of adoptions, to respond to the children’s needs and to allow them to be welcomed into the new family, in order to grow up in a healthy environment and to have a normal psychological development(12).

Therefore, it might be hastily assumed that the protection of children’s rights granted within the inter-American system of human rights has had a positive impact on the Brazilian legal system; however, a few decisions of the TSJ should be analysed in depth to understand whether and to what extent the Inter-American Court has really driven the internal decisions of Brazilian judges.

One of the first judgments in which the Brazilian Superior Court has mentioned the principle of “melhor interesse da criança” is the “recurso especial” (henceforth RESP) n. 889 852 of 27/04/2010: this case concerned the request made by a homosexual woman who demanded to adopt her partner’s child in order to grant the minor a better economic stability(13).

At that time, the Brazilian jurisdiction had not yet regulated the same-sex marriage, with the possibility for the same sex couple to adopt children, as in other States of Latin America(14).

In this case, the social worker appointed by the Court judges stated that parenthood was exercised by both women with responsibility and attention to the needs of children, in a harmonious and well established home environment; the children had followed an apparently normal development for their age and were fully integrated in the family and society(15).

According to the judges of the TSJ it is necessary to underline the prevalence of the children’s interests as compared to all other rights at stake, since, in cases like this, it is essential to protect the right of children to filiation, from which all the consequences determining the life of every individual derive.

Therefore, the question of the possibility of adoption by homosexual couples is necessarily linked to the obligation to find the best possible solution to protect the rights of children, since the two questions are inextricably linked(16).

In this regard, the TSJ emphasizes that no specialized study has ever shown the problems arising from the adoption of children by homosexual couples: thus, according to the judges, “if scientific studies don’t indicate any disadvantage for children, and if the children are brought up with love”, the granting of adoption should be given to the applicant: in fact, in this case, in which the children had been living with the same-sex couple since birth, the refusal of adoption itself would have denied the right to full protection, since children could only rely on the parent whose name appeared within their birth certificate.

Besides the material injury that would have resulted from the failure of the adoption grant, the judges also highlighted the related ethical and moral issues, since they claimed that the Judiciary Power could not “turn a blind eye to phenomenal reality”: in fact, in this case both the applicant and her partner are responsible for the upbringing and education of the two children and consequently, they exercise the parental responsibility jointly(17).

In the Court’s opinion, the adoption is to be primarily “an act of love and gratuity” which aims to serve the children’s interests : in this case the benefits deriving from the adoption are absolutely obvious from any standpoint , both in relation to the consolidated situation and in relation to the norm about the primacy of the integral protection of children, also in accordance with Article 43 of the ECA (“A adoção será deferida quando apresentar reais vantagens para o adotando e fundar-se em motivos legítimos”); conversely, serious harm for the lives of the children could result from the failure to grant the adoption(18).

The judgment in question was favourably welcomed by the majority of commentators: it was pointed out that, since in the Brazilian legal system there was no law authorizing nor prohibiting the adoption by individuals of the same sex, the refusal to grant the adoption of children to homosexual couple would only show a clear prejudice in this matter: in fact, in the Civil Code and in the ECA, no restrictions exist with regard to sex, marital status, or even sexual orientation of the adoptive parents, since the only concern of the legislature would only be to ensure the well-being of the child(19).

However, there have been no other judgments by the STJ concerning the same subject from 2010 to the present: thus, although this decision is indicative of the widespread desire to extend the possibility of adoption to homosexual couples, it would be premature, in absence of further evidence, to consider the judgment in question as revelatory of a definitive change in the trend.

Nevertheless, it appears highly significant that in other judgments of the STJ concerning adoptions, which are analysed below, the judges of the Court always utilize the best interests of the child principle, confirming the will to privilege and protect the real needs of the growing children. For example, a confirmation can be found in the judgment no. 1,106,637 of 2010, in which the STJ examined a request for waiver of parental rights by an adoptive couple against natural parents of the child: with regard to parental responsibility the judges of the STJ argued that the latter is established in “interests of the children and not the benefit of parents”: therefore, they confirmed that only starting from this premise it is possible to examine the confirmation or revocation of parental rights. In fact, citing François Laurent, the judges stated that “the power of the father and mother is none other than that of the protection and guidance”(20).

Furthermore, the fundamental right of the children and adolescents to be raised and educated within their own family, inserted into art. ECA 19, includes a “wide” concept of family life, so as to allow the child to grow as well as possible in a healthy environment: therefore, the judge has to collect all relevant information to decide in accordance with the best interests of the child(21).

Because of the intricate and complex family ties established in the legal world, which are often amplified by the intertwining of interests, rights and duties of the various components of the extended family, the judge must be guided in all cases by the principle of the best interests of the child, demanding the utmost consistency, both from the biological and socio-affective parents, to promote greater harmony in family life and a consequent safety for children placed in the middle of these unusual plots. Therefore, on the basis of this assessment Family Law matters, focused on the doctrine of the integral protection of children and adolescents, would be radically modified by granting the adoption to people with no parental responsibility or who do not pursue the interests of the child, or even worse, who can create confusion or contradiction for the full development of the child(22).

In another case concerning adoption, the TSJ judges better clarified that the preference to be given to children’s rights should be considered “absolute” The special case in question is intended to determine whether it is correct, in the adoption process, to give priority to couples entered in the register of the adoptive parents as against the claim of the appellants (who were not present in this register) to adopt a child, entrusted to them by the biological mother and raised in their custody on the basis of a Court decision for the first eight months of life. In addition, the judges also addressed the issue concerning the “intuitu personae” adoption (in which the biological parents of the child choose the family that adopts the child), to determine whether the latter procedure is a spurious form of adoption, which could facilitate the illegal trafficking of children(23).

The judges of the Court argued that the institution of the adopted children register is definitely built to protect the best interests of the child, resulting an excellent oversight to minimize the phenomenon of child trafficking and allowing a level playing field for those who wish to adopt. However, the fulfilment of this register, that is to say the preference for the couple previously recorded for the adoption of a particular child, is not absolute, since according to the best interests of the child, (foundation and guide of the whole child protection system) when there is an emotional bond between the child and the applicants for the adoption, the latter is to be preferred, even when the name of the interested parties is not present in the aforementioned register(24).

As regards the adoption “intuitu personae” and the possible consequences related to child trafficking, in this case the judges emphasized that the biological mother had not received any gain through granting the adoption to the applicant couple, as it emerged from the evaluation of the psychosocial study; moreover, in deference to the primacy of the interests of the child, they observed that, the emotional bond between the child and the adoptive parents were to prevail over events (i.e. the fact that the eldest child of the same couple had already been given for adoption to another family) since the circumstance did not show anything that might be attributable to the trafficking of minors.Finally, the judges of the TSJ considered the question by the Court of first instance about whether it was fair or not that the child should in any case be entrusted to another couple entered in the register of adoption, despite having lived his first eight months with the appellant couple. on this point, the judges of the TSJ stated that it was not reasonable, from the point of view of the best interests of the child, to transfer the custody of the child to another couple registered in the general register, but unrelated to the adoption process, since such option would raise only further legal uncertainty. The aim was to give priority to the right of the child to be adopted by the couple with whom he had established bonds of affection(25).

The final case under consideration concerns the determination of jurisdiction in case of custody dispute(26).

In this case, judges clarified that the principle of immediate judgment establishes that the jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate measures, actions and procedures that protect the interests, rights and guarantees provided in the ECA is determined by the place where the child or the teenager lives and exercises his right to family and community life regularly: the rule expressed by the Statute stands as a special rule of superordinate nature, compared to the general rules of jurisdiction in civil procedure law(27).

According to the judges of the Court, the determination of jurisdiction by a court dispute concerning the custody or adoption must necessarily ensure the primacy to the Best Interests of the Child, even if this means ignoring another mandatory rule that regulates the immediate judgment itself; in fact, the principle on which it is based provides that thanks to a greater closeness with the child, it is possible to respond to the aims of ECA the most effectively, as well as it allows the performance of effective remedies, through rapid interaction between the judge, the child and his parents or guardians(28).

As evidenced by Olegário Gurgel Ferreira Gomes, in fact, the closeness between the Court and he who is judged, which is determined with regard to the peculiar condition of minors, is an expression of the principle of the immediate judgment, logical corollary of the principles of “the integral protection” and the “best interests of the child”: the aim is to give effect to the fundamental rights through the priority given to the provision of public services in the case of legal remedies, as required by art. 227 CF and Article 4 letter. b) ECA(29).

Therefore, Article 147, I and II, ECA, concerning territorial jurisdiction, has absolute value and prevails over the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, expressing a binding rule which ,under certain aspects, does not admit any exception: in other words, the need to guarantee the children’s right to family and community life along with offering legal services as a priority and giving imperative nature to the determination of competence(30).

III. CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS IN THE ARGENTINE JURIDICAL SYSTEM

Once analysed the situation of Brazil, attention is to be directed to the Argentine system, considering both the role of children within the legal system of this Country at normative level and the reflection that conventional law determines at the domestic level.

Most importantly, it is to be noted that the age of majority in Argentina is not acquired at the age of 18, but at the age of 21(when citizens become “adultos”) and that there is also a difference between those who are under 21 but over14 (“menores”) and those who are under 14 (“menores impúberes”)(31).

This short legislative analysis focuses on the rules present in the Argentine Civil Code: however, it is necessary to emphasize that the “Código Civil de la Nacion Argentina”, introduced in 1869 by the “Ley n.º 340” is not currently in force, as it was replaced by the new Argentine Civil Code, the “Código Civil y Comercial de La Nacion”, promulgated in 2014 and fully in force since 1 August 2015(32).

Therefore, our analysis will refer to the rules of the new Code and not those of the previous Code.

It is surprising to note the strong level of innovation present in the current code compared to the previous, especially in relation to the consideration of minors. In fact, under the previous Code, there was only one reminder of the best interests of the child within the art. 321 of the Civil Code, as reformulated by the LEY Nº 24,779 of 1997, which said: “En el juicio de adopción deberán observarse las siguientes reglas:…i) El juez o Tribunal en todos los casos deberá valorar el interés superior del menor”(33), rule was inspired by Art. 21 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 1989(34).

Actually, it is certainly possible to say that within the current code, the “interés superior del niño” constitutes a real guiding principle: in fact, is called up sixteen times (not including the references attached to the final Explanatory tables) and in very different sectors(35).

More specifically, the references to this principle are made with special regard to adoption (art. 595, 604, 621, 627, 2637), but also in relation to parental responsibility (art. 639, 2639), to children born out of wedlock (art. 64), to family proceedings (art. 706), to the declaration of parentage obtained abroad (including cases of birth through techniques of medical assisted procreation; art. 2634) and, finally, to the international child abduction (art. 2642).

Particularly, as regards adoption, it is stated that the principle of “interés superior del niño” is to be considered as the first cardinal principle, followed by the right to identity of the minors, the right to remain in their original family, the right to preserve the fraternal bonds, the right to know their origins, and the right of the child to be listened in relation to his/her age and maturity (art. 595), thereby showing full accordance to the latest international guidelines(36).

But the most important innovation regarding the protection of minors is certainly present in the Constitution (Constitución de la Nacion Argentina), since the reform of 1994 introduced Article 75 which affirmed the hierarchical prevalence of the international treaties and agreements, defined as “sources of rank higher than laws”: in paragraph 22 the UN Convention on the Rights is mentioned as a source of constitutional level along with the various Conventions and Declarations on human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. The International sources are therefore complementary to the rights and guarantees recognized in the Constitution(37). In the following paragraph it is added that it is the duty of the Congress to legislate and promote measures to ensure real equality of opportunity, treatment and the full enjoyment and exercise of rights recognized by this Constitution and international treaties on human rights, with particular reference to children, women, the elderly and the disabled.

To conclude this brief analysis of the regulatory framework, it is essential to mention, the LEY 26061/2005 “De Protección Integral de los Derechos de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes”, which adopted an approach of “ child as subject of law”, hallmark of the UN Convention of 1989, placing itself as one of the landmarks in the framework of the rights of children and adolescents, both in legal and political terms(38).

As stated in Article 1 the object of this law is

“la protección integral de los derechos de las niñas, niños y adolescentes que se encuentren en el territorio de la República Argentina, para garantizar el ejercicio y disfrute pleno, efectivo y permanente de aquellos reconocidos en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional y en los tratados internacionales en los que la Nación sea parte”(39).

Finally, in the same article it is specified that the rights recognized by law are insured in their maximum chargeability and are based on the Principle of “interés superior del niño”(40).

III.1. The “Interés superior del niño” in the jurisprudence of the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación Argentina

Also, with regard to the Argentine system, a few judgments of the Supreme Court of Justice (hereafter CSJN) will be analysed which are very significant both in terms of the relationship between the internal judgment and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights(41), and, more strictly, the protection of children’s rights in the Argentine context.

The first judgment analysed is related to a case of request for adoption of a minor. After her daughter’s birth, a mother decided to entrust the latter to another couple of parents, who were preparing to start the paperwork for an adoption; however, after a few years, the biological mother demanded the return of the child, who at that time was already eight years’ age and, after the refusal of the foster parents, she decided to take legal action(42).

Her judicial claims found acceptance both in the first and the second instance: instead, the CSJN, reversing decisions of courts of first instance and appeal, the CSJN granted the needs of foster parents. Very interestingly, the CSJN judges’ reasoning and argumentation focused on the specific assessment of the best interests of the child, subject of contention(43).

Indeed, on the one hand the judges of CSJN emphasized the importance of the fact that all children are brought up by their biological parents in their original family context, stressing that in this case there was no greater interest for the child to return to live with her family; besides, there was the risk of a possible loss of personal identity(44); on the other hand, the judges affirmed the importance of evaluating the best option for the child in the concrete case, evaluating the bonds of affection that the child had established during her life(45).

Therefore, the Supreme Court of Justice cannot refrain from putting the evaluation of “the best interest of the child” principle at the heart of its analysis, considering that “consideración primordial del interés del niño”, which Article. 3 of the CRC requires to all national authorities, guides and influences the decisions of all courts, including the Supreme Court’s, which is bound to respect international treaties, ex art. 75 point 22 of the Constitution.

This principle, stated the Court, has two basic aims: the first is to act as the basis for resolving possible conflicts of interest; the second is to act as an objective parameter that allows to solve the problems of children, in the most favourable terms for them. It’s therefore the State’s duty to ensure that also in cases of adoption, the interests of the child are to be the main consideration and, to this regard, the judges pointed out that the concept of “identitad filiatoria” is not only constituted by the biological element, as the “biological truth” is not an absolute value: actually, the identity develops through the links created by the adoption which are an axiological element to which the law must give value to protect the interests of the child(46).

In this aspect, the decision of the Supreme Court judges is in full accordance with the international rules: in fact, also the CRC predicts the possibility of the child’s separation from the family of origin only as a extrema ratio, when it becomes necessary for the protection of the interests of the child(47).

In another case the judges of the Court analyse the profile of the right to health of the child, concerning the refusal of a parent to present his son to the ritual medical vaccinations, in accordance with the mandatory state vaccination plan(48).

In that pronunciation the judges of the Court argued that in front of the refusal of parents to access their children to the vaccination plan it is possible and necessary to act coercively stating that the exercise of parental responsibility is not absolute, since it is limited by the best interests of children(49).

In fact, it is a duty of the State to protect the children’s health, and as for this point there’s a collision between the parents’ autonomy to choose the health care for themselves with their duty to protect their children , for this reason the state is obliged to ensure the access to the health care system for all children: the objection of the applicants against the government ‘s decision was raised on the basis of this assumption which was defined as “compulsive paternalism”, being in clear breach of the principle of autonomy of the person(50).

The Court underlines that the scope of each individual’s privacy is unquestionably protected by the Constitution: article 19, in fact, recognizes an area of freedom in which the fundamental decisions concerning the human person can be freely adopted, without any intervention from the state, unless such decisions violate public order, public morality or the rights of third parties(51).

Therefore, it is clear that the decision taken by the applicants, following the implementation of their family lives (the family belongs to the Jehovah’s Witnesses movement(52)), prejudiced the rights of third parties, as it posed a serious threat to the health of all the community, undermined the effectiveness of the official system of vaccination and therefore couldn’t be considered as one of the private actions provided for in Article 19.

This is because the health instrument of vaccination not only affects the person who receives it but the whole community, its main objective being just to avoid infection in the population, which therefore involves a public interest of a general nature(53).

At this point, also the World Health Organization, of which Argentina is a member, stated that it is necessary not only to reduce diseases that are preventable but that the phenomenon of child mortality must be phased out(54).

Once clarified this aspect, the Court’s judges also argued that, in some cases, the family right to privacy may be restricted by the State defence of the best interests of the child, a vulnerable subject, in need of protection, by a legal system whose main characteristic is to give precedence to his or her interest over all the interests involved(55).

Consequently, against the interest of the parents to ensure that their child did not access to the compulsory vaccination treatments, in favour of homeopathic alternative treatments, it was necessary that the child’s interest had the priority: in this regard, the judges highlighted that the Argentine State is bound by international treaty provisions, including Article. 19 of the American Convention on Human Rights, and cannot fail in its duties, since, in such cases, the best interests of the child are involved, which must prevail over all other considerations(56).

In conclusion, according to the Court, the best way to realize the interests of the child is to ensure such a present course and, at the same time, to reduce to a minimum the possibility of future irreversible damage to his health: for this purpose, the non-subjection to vaccination would expose the child to contract diseases in the future, and the parental behaviour would be harming both to the public health and the interests of the child, for the pursuit of which all the disease prevention methods must be deployed, including, of course, vaccinations(57).

III.2 “Interés superior del niño” and right to be heard between knowledge of origins and criminal responsibility

After analysing the problems relating to the adoption and to the child ‘s right to health, another pronunciation of CSJN will be analysed concerning a divorce case and contextual custody of the child, in which, once again, the Court judges evaluated the interests of the child as a priority(58).

In this case, during the previous sets of proceedings, the judges accepted the father’s request demanding to submit his daughter to a DNA test in order to prove that, although born in wedlock, the latter wasn’t his biological daughter: to justify the legitimacy of the use of DNA testing tool he had not mentioned any reasons relating to the change of the child’s family status (which had not been modified), but only personal reasons related to the right to know one’s origins(59).

The applicant strongly disputed the priority given by the judges to the alleged biological truth, claiming that neither the principle of “amplitud evidence”, nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child, authorize to devise a real “Right to filiation”(60): therefore, the request for DNA testing of her daughter, made by the male parent, is in contrast with art. 3.1 of the CRC, which provides for the respect of the interests of the child(61).

The judges of CSJN reaffirmed that, when the adoption of a particular measure of inquiry may result in a harm to the child, it is necessary to prove that the non-adoption of the child cause a greater or more serious damage for the child: it is always a duty of the Courts to provide a solution capable of satisfying as well as possible the needs of the child’s developing personality, in this way preventing the use of dogmatic or aprioristic justification(62).

The same judges confirmed that in this case the DNA test, potentially carrying physical and mental consequences, either negative or positive, on the person, didn’t cause any alteration to the child’s family status but it was directly connected to the personal identity of the child: therefore, it was noted that no one heard the minor’s opinion (who at that time was 14), since both Article. 12 of the CRC that the Law 26.061, guarantee the right of the child to be heard(63).

In fact, the courts of appeal failed to demonstrate that the DNA evidence would favour the interests of the child, rather than just be of benefit to the parent, and they didn’t primarily allow the child the right to express her opinion about it, appropriately informing her about the consequences that could have arisen if, the evidence had shown that she had real genetic incompatibility with her own father(64).

Indeed, it is still doubtful whether to proceed to listening to the child in cases like this, which may cause him serious psychological consequences, regardless of the choice the child might make. However, the judges of TSJN deserve to be acknowledged for proceeding through accurate analysis of all available data related to the specific situation of the minor, and for rejecting aprioristic and abstract logic(65).

Also, the last pronunciation dealing with a case of juvenile criminal law, the child’s right to be heard plays a central role.

Indeed, the ruling is related to a case in which the Public Prosecution demanded the condemnation of a minor under eighteen years’ age for manslaughter, because the boy had hit a woman with his motorcycle. The “Cámera Nacional de Casación Penal” had previously issued judgement condemning the child to six months in prison with a conditional sentence, in addition to eight years of license suspension: however, the applicant’s lawyers claimed that the court’s decision was totally arbitrary because based on a broad interpretation of art. 4 of Law 22,278 of 1980, which provides for the “necessity” of the sanction in case of criminal offenses committed by minors(66).

Referring to art. 3 of the CRC, the applicants stated that, in this case, the judges should have proceeded keeping in mind the principle of “best interests of the child”: in accordance with it, given the circumstances of the case, it was not appropriate to apply such penalty, because as demanded by the law governing the criminal regime of minors, the judges should have given relevance to the “background of the child”, the result of the tutelary proceeding(to which the child had already been submitted) and the general impression received by the judges.

On the basis of these premises, also in this case the judges of the Court focused on the need for the juvenile justice system to be oriented to the respect of the UN Convention on children’s rights: starting from what was first defined an excellent behaviour taken by the child at the time of tutelary treatment, both with reference to the psychological progress and therapeutic attention, which would alleviate the existence of alleged “serious conduct” of the child driving his motorcycle(67).

The reason for which the legislature has provided such a wide power to the judge, when he is to decide about crimes committed by minors, is to ensure that the punishment primarily pursues the goal of the child’s re-socialization and to promote his social reintegration, in such a way as to allow the latter to be consequently able to carry out a constructive function in society(68).

Relying on the material and spiritual support of the family, the young man in question had willingly accepted the realization of a therapeutic treatment had shown seriousness and correctness during the trial and serious repentance for the harm that he had caused: these data are very indicative, both according to Ley 22,787 and Art. 41 of the Argentine Penal Code(69) which enhance “the direct impression received by the Court” about the suspect’s behaviour during the trial(70).

Therefore, since the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court has failed to prove the existence of conditions that could justify the need for the application of a penalty, and given the precedents of the child along with the results of tutelary treatment and the sensation received by the Court, it is necessary to interpret Article. 4 of ley 22,787 in the prospect of the rehabilitative goal that punishment plays, in relation to the crimes committed by juvenile offenders(71).

These examples show that in the Argentine legal system, the UN Convention of 1989 and the principle of the “Best interest of the child” play a central role not only from a regulatory point of view, but also and above all, in the interpretation of law cases of the Supreme Organ of the legitimacy, whose judges do not hesitate to invoke the respect of the Constitution, especially in the light of the most recent international legal provisions and its fundamental principles.

IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC COURTS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The cases of adoptions analysed suggest that the judgments expressed by the Brazilian Supreme Court were highly respectful of children’s rights, as the logical and argumentative process undoubtedly focused on the interests of the children: however, although the matter of the adoption of minors plays a central role in the Juvenile legislation, it seems noteworthy that this is, de facto, the only context in which the judges thematise and use the principle of “melhor interesse da criança”.

In the cases ruled by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in fact, the best interests of the child has been a guiding principle for the decisions in very sensitive matters, such as forced disappearances and mass killings, as well as in cases of structural violations of children rights, resulting from regulatory or judicial practice of States that were harmful for minors.

But if on the one hand, these dynamics may appear as totally unrelated to the Brazilian system, in which children would live in a sort of irenic situation in which all of their rights and interests are fully guaranteed and protected, on the other hand appears self-evident as such reconstruction is very far from reality: and, indeed, as early as 1997, the Organization of American States (OAS), through the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, focusing on the critical issues on which the Brazilian state would have to commit its efforts, in the field of human rights, devoted the fifth chapter of the first “Report on the Situation of human rights in Brazil” just to “violence against children”(72).

Among the various recommendations in the Report, the Commission requested the Brazilian State to: 1) protect the life and physical integrity of children and street children by taking effective measures to promote their education, rehabilitation and integration into society; 2) adopt protection and surveillance measures to eliminate the exploitation of labour of children under 14; 3) prevent and suppress acts of torture and abuse received by minors in prisons and institutions in which they are held; 4) put an end to situations of slavery and prostitution of children and adolescents, trying and punishing the exploiters and clients(73).

Indeed, taking the example of the topic of child labour exploitation of 14 years, throughout the Jurisprudence of Legitimacy can be found only 13 decisions of the TSJ, in which this issue is discussed, and, moreover, in these few cases, there’s no trace of the Principle of “melhor interesse da criança”.

And even more relevant is the fact that within the “legal references” of the 33 cases where the Court of Legitimacy uses the term ‘melhor interesse da criança” is never mentionated the American Convention on Human Rights, or the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, among the sources used by the judges: the sources of reference standards used, in fact, are internal sources, mostly, the Federal Constitution, the Civil Code and especially the “Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente” of 1990.

The above considerations make it possible to do extensive reflections, more general, just about the effectiveness of the rulings of the Inter-American Court within countries of the Organization of American States, and about the concrete possibility of a real control of conventionality on the regulatory and judicial decisions of the Member States.

V. CHILDREN RIGHTS IN LATIN-AMERICAN AND THE CONTROL OF CONVENTIONALITY

From the analysis of Brazilian and Argentina domestic law, the importance accorded by the national courts with the international regulations and jurisprudence is distinctly different with regard to the theme of children’s rights.

In fact, if in its analysis, Argentine judges analysed in detail and punctually the cases in question, in comparison with the relevant international standards, the Brazilian counterparts, however, do not almost never refer with international regulations or jurisprudence, merely citing the domestic’s(74).

However, in contrast to Brazil, where there’s no constitutional provision governing the relationship between national laws and international treaties, in Argentina, the work of judges is simplified by the introduction of Article 75 (22) of the Federal Constitution. In fact, the judges use this legal provision to invoke the international treaties and, in the case of minors, in particular the CRC and the American Convention on Human Rights(75), thus showing a willingness to engage a real control of conventionality, both implicitly, through the arguments followed for judges, and explicitly, through specific references to international regulations(76).

But from the observation of this two different approaches, the question arises about the compulsory of the international treaties by the member Countries of the OAS, with particular reference to the American Convention on Human Rights: in this regard, the Inter-American Court itself has repeatedly stated that the domestic courts have an obligation to exercise not only the “control de constitucionalidad” but also the “control de convencionalidad”, ex officio, between national law and conventional clauses in order to ensure full compliance with the Convention(77).

And, in fact, one of the duties of the States subjected to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court (Article 62 p. 3 American Convention), is certainly to respect the rights contained in the Pact of San José (art. 1 p.1(78)) and to adopt internal legal provisions to enforce rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (art. 2(79)).

The effectiveness of such rules take effect inter partes to the countries to which the judgments of the Court have been pronounced(80), and would be also erga omnes to all other States Parties to the Convention, whose domestic courts must give effect to the treaty provisions, in accordance with the interpretation of the jurisprudence of San Jose(81).

And the motivation of this compulsory should derive by the fact that the “human rights” would form a separate category as a modern Inter-American “corpus juris”, with binding force and constitutional supremacy: these special rights would represent a kind of “Kompetenz-Kompetenz” even when the Constitutions of the Member States do not expressly provide them(82).

However, serious doubts persist regarding this interpretation: there’s still a lot of scepticism about the effect that would result from this approach, because it could anticipate, by judicial decision, certain claims that have not yet been appropriate recognition on the level of social consciousness and therefore on the normative level(83).

For this reason, a similar approach, based on a form of “acquis conventionnel” which accords high priority to fundamental rights, but does not interact in any way with the internal constitutional development processes of the Country, it can be counter-productive. The outcome could be to further weaken the precarious and unstable equilibrium of political and legal institutions of the Latin American States; finally, the Inter-American Court judgments could be perceived as invasive and artificial, rather than as the result of a virtuous judicial process of a subsidiary nature(84).

NOTAS:

(1). It was partially modified from the Constitutional amendment no. 42 of 19 December 2003; the full text is available on http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm (access 04.12.2018)

(2). See I.P. Holanda, “A doutrina da situação irregular do menor e a doutrina da proteção integral”, Âmbito Jurídico, n° 106, November 2012.

(3). Art. 227, Constituição de 1988 da República Federativa do Brasil. Other significant articles are art. 228 that says: “São penalmente inimputáveis os menores de dezoito anos, sujeitos às normas da legislação especial”; and then, Art. 229. “Os pais têm o dever de assistir, criar e educar os filhos menores, e os filhos maiores têm o dever de ajudar e amparar os pais na velhice, carência ou enfermidade”.

(4). To explore the theme of the integral protection’s doctrine see, D. O’Donnel, La Doctrina de La Protección Integral y las Normas Jurídicas Vigentes en Relación a la Familia, Biblioteca Juridica Virtual – Instituto de Invegaciones Juridicas, Mexico City, 30 September 2004, pp. 119-161 available on http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/5/2467/8.pdf; see also, B. P. Fontoura, A Aplicação da Doutrina da Proteção Integral da Criança e do Adolescente pelo Judiciário Brasileiro, monograph published by University Center of Brasília – Uniceub Faculdade De Ciências Jurídicas e Sociais – Fajs Núcleo de Pesquisa e Monografia, n° 22, Brasilia, 2011, available on http://repositorio.uniceub.br/bitstream/123456789/314/3/20612365.pdf (access 04.12.2018)

(5). R. Varalda, “Políticas Públicas da Infância”, Boletim Científico da Escola Superior do MPU, n° 27, April/June 2008, pp.11-44.

(6). Cf. Lei nº 8.069, 13 July 1990, Dispõe sobre o Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente e dá outras providências, Art. 2, available on http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8069.htm (access 04.12.2018).

(7). Lei nº 8.069, 13 July 1990, cit., Art. 3. For a comprehensive overview about the recent history of the Rights of Children and Adolescents in Brazil, with particular reference to the contribution provided by the ECA, see, over all, A. Macias Lot - A. P. Lazzaretti de Souza - S. Koller, “Child and Adolescent Rights in Brazil”, The International Journal of Children’s Rights, n° 4, 2015, pp. 818-843.

(8). Código Civil, L. No. 10.406 of 10 Juanary 2002. Available on: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2002/l10406.htm (access 04.12.2018).

(9). Código Penal, D.L. No. 2.848, of 7 December 1940. Available on: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto-lei/del2848.htm (access 04.12.2018).

(10). The structure and functions of the TSJ are regulated by Art. 105 of “Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil” of 1988.

(11). See N.L. Lima Suares- R. Lima De Abreu Aoki - T. Ribeiro De Souza – W. Ken Aoki, “A Hermenêutica da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos sobre os Direitos das Crianças e sua aplicação no Processo de Adoção pelo Brasil”, Revista Iniciação Científica, n° 13, 2013, p. 146.

(12). N.L. Lima Suares- R. Lima De Abreu Aoki - T. Ribeiro De Souza – W. Ken Aoki, “A Hermenêutica da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos sobre os Direitos das Crianças e sua aplicação no Processo de Adoção pelo Brasil”, cit., p. 147.

(13). See STJ, REsp n. 889.852, 27/03/2010. All decisions of “Superior Tribunal de Justiça” are available on http://www.stj.jus.br/SCON/

(14). However, it is necessary to point out that as of May 2013, the National Council of Justice (CNJ), which monitors the independence of the judiciary, has predicted that the registrars are obliged to authorize also the marriage between persons of the same sex. The resolution states that: “É vedada às autoridades competentes a recusa de habilitação, celebração de casamento civil ou de conversão de união estável em casamento entre pessoas de mesmo sexo”. The duty, therefore, binds the entire Federal State and also allows the conversion of the status of couples, as regularly united in marriage, thus making legal the wedding for same-sex couples. The resolution of the CNJ is No. 175 of 14/05/2013, available on http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/imprensa/resolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o_n_175.pdf (access 04.12.2018).

(15). See STJ, REsp n. n. 889.852, pp. 9-10.

(16). See STJ, REsp n. n. 889.852, pp. 11-12

(17). See STJ, REsp n. n. 889.852, p. 12

(18). See STJ, REsp n. n. 889.852, pp. 13-15

(19). See G.S. Soares Balestero – A.G. Melo Franco Bahia, “O Melhor Interesse Da Criança: A Adoção Homoafetiva no Direito Brasileiro”, Revista Jurídica Cesumar - Mestrado, n° 1, 2011, p. 256.

(20). See STJ, REsp n. n. 1.106.637/2010, p. 16. This expression is contained in F. Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Français, n°4/260, Bruxelles – Paris, 1869, p. 350.

(21). STJ, REsp n. n. 1.106.637/2010 cit., p.18

(22). STJ, REsp n. n. 1.106.637/2010 cit., p.19

(23). The case is, STJ, REsp n. 1.172.067 of 14/04/2010.

(24). See STJ, REsp n. 1.172.067, p. 8

(25). See STJ, REsp n. 1.172.067, pp. 10-11

(26). The case is TSJ, CC n. 111.130 of 01/02/2011.

(27). TSJ, CC n. 111.130 cit., p. 14

(28). TSJ, CC n. 111.130 cit., p. 13

(29). See O. Gurgel Ferreira Gomes, “Princípio do juízo imediato – o direito à convivência familiar e comunitária como elemento definidor da competência territorial para ações judiciais amparadas na Lei n° 8.069/90”, Acts of the “XXI Congresso da Associaçao Brasileira de Magistrados e Promotores de Justiça da Infância e da Juventude – ABMP, 2006, available on https://www.academia.edu (access 04.12.2018).

(30). See TSJ, CC n. 111.130 of 01/02/2011, p. 14

(31). To rebuild the meaning and consequences of this distinction also in relation to the UN Convention on Rights of the Child of 1989, see S. Viola, “Autonomía progresiva de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el Código Civil: una deuda pendiente”, Cuestión de Derechos, n° 3, 2012, pp. 82-98

(32). The project of the “Nuevo Codigo Civil” is available on http://www.nuevocodigocivil.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/texto-proyecto-de-codigo-civil-y comercial-de-la-nacion.pdf (access 04.12.2018). For a coomprhensive and organic comment of theis civil law reform see, among all, M. Herrera, “Panorama general del derecho de las familias en el Código Civil y Comercial. Reformar para transformar”, Sup. Esp. Nuevo Código Civil y Comercial, 2014 (Noviembre), 17/11/2014, p. 39; see also, J.A.M., Mazzinghi, “El Código Civil y Comercial y las relaciones de familia, LA LEY 24/04/2015”, LA LEY, 2015-B, p. 1077; U.C. Basset, Incidencia en el derecho de familia del proyecto de Código con media sanción, LA LEY, 2013-F, p. 1056

(33). The article 321 of the Civil Code, in addition to the one mentioned, disciplined eight other rules to be observed in the trial involving minors and specifically states that a) La acción debe interponerse ante el juez o Tribunal del domicilio del adoptante o del lugar donde se otorgó la guarda; b) Son partes el adoptante y el Ministerio Público de Menores; c) El juez o Tribunal de acuerdo a la edad del menor y a su situación personal, oirá personalmente, sí lo juzga conveniente, al adoptado, conforme al derecho que lo asiste y a cualquier otra persona que estime conveniente en beneficio del menor; d) El juez o Tribunal valorará si la adopción es conveniente para el menor teniendo en cuenta los medios de vida y cualidades morales y personales del o de los adoptantes, así como la diferencia de edad entre el adoptante y el adoptado; e) El juez o tribunal podrá ordenar, y el Ministerio Público de Menores requerir las medidas de prueba o informaciones que estimen convenientes; f) Las audiencias serán privadas y el expediente seráreservado y secreto. Solamente podrá ser examinado por las partes, sus letrados, sus apoderados y los peritosintervinientes; g) El juez o tribunal no podrá entregar o remitir los autos, debiendo solamente expedir testimonios de sus constancias ante requerimiento fundado de otro magistrado, quien estará obligado a respetar el principio de reserva en protección del interés del menor; h) Deberá constar en la sentencia que el adoptante se ha comprometido a hacer conocer al adoptado su realidad biológica.

(34). On this point, it is very illustrative the parallel highlighted by M. Hebe, M. Muro, Derecho de familia: familia y proceso de estado, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, 2000, p. 50.

(35). The expression “interés superior del niño” is mentioned in Articles 26; 64; 104; 113; 595; 604; 621; 627; 639; 671; 706; 2634 (2 times); 2637; 2639; 2642.

(36). See M. Herrera, Panorama general del derecho de las familias en el Código Civil y Comercial. Reformar para transformar, cit., p.36, who defines the code as “nuevo y merecido texto, fruto de la democracia, y el desarrollo y consolidación de la doctrina internacional de los Derechos Humanos.

(37). See M. Rosti, Argentina, Boulogne, 2011, pp. 87 et seq. In addition, was discussed about “constitutional supremacy of treaties” in reference to the equalization of international treaties to the primary law sources. For a more detailed investigation and a historical overview of the “Bloque de Constitucionalidad” in Argentina see, M. E. Góngora Mera, El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en Argentina y en la lucha contra la relevancia impunidad, Nuremberg, 2007, pp. 1-35

(38). See M.E. Góngora Mera, El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en Argentina y su relevancia en la lucha contra la impunidad, cit., p. 13

(39). For a detailed analysis of the Ley 26061, see Protección Integral de Derechos de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes. Análisis de la ley 26061, ed. E. García Méndez, Editores del Puerto, Buenos Aires, 2008.

(40). The connotations of the principle of the interés superior del niño are then outlined in a more articulated way in the Art. 3, entitled “Interés superior”, that says: “A los efectos de la presente ley se entiende por interés superior de la niña, niño y adolescente la máxima satisfacción, integral y simultánea de los derechos y garantías reconocidos en esta ley. Debiéndose respetar: a) Su condición de sujeto de derecho; b) El derecho de las niñas, niños y adolescentes a ser oídos y que su opinión sea tenida en cuenta; c) El respeto al pleno desarrollo personal de sus derechos en su medio familiar, social y cultural; d) Su edad, grado de madurez, capacidad de discernimiento y demás condiciones personales; e) El equilibrio entre los derechos y garantías de las niñas, niños y adolescentes y las exigencias del bien común; f) Su centro de vida. Se entiende por centro de vida el lugar donde las niñas, niños y adolescentes hubiesen transcurrido en condiciones legítimas la mayor parte de su existencia. Este principio rige en materia de patria potestad, pautas a las que se ajustarán el ejercicio de la misma, filiación, restitución del niño, la niña o el adolescente, adopción, emancipación y toda circunstancia vinculada a las anteriores cualquiera sea el ámbito donde deba desempeñarse. Cuando exista conflicto entre los derechos e intereses de las niñas, niños y adolescentes frente a otros derechos e intereses igualmente legítimos, prevalecerán los primeros”.

(41). On the relationship between the two kind of jurisprudence (Argentine and Inter-American) and about the question relating to the control of conventionality in Argentina see M.G. Abalos, “Avances del control de convencionalidad en Argentina”, Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, n° 1, 2013, pp. 115-34; about the relationship between the control of conventionality and the margin of appreciation see M.A. Villanueva, “El control de convencionalidad y el correcto uso del margen de apreciación: medios necesarios para la protección de los derechos humanos fundamentals”, Act of the Congress of Public Law for students and postgraduates ‘Democarcia y Derechos’, UBA, Buenos Aires, 31 May / 1 June 2012, pp. 7-14, available on http://www.derecho.uba.ar/institucional/deinteres/derechos-humanos-marcos-villanueva.pdf.

(42). The case is S., C.S/adopción of 02.08.2005 - judgment no. 328: 2870. All pronunciations of CSJN be found through the search engine of the Court’s website on http://www.csjn.gov.ar/confal/ConsultaCompletaFallos.do?method=iniciaConsulta

(43). The doctrine has very positively welcomed the ruling in question, praising the prevalence granted by judges of the CSJN to the interests of the child compared to those of other parties to litigation, in compliance with the requirements of international treaties; See D. Freedman, “Consecuencias del interés superior del niño en los derechos sociales de la infancia”, Revista Argentina de Derecho Penal y Procesal Penal, n° 1, 2011, pp. 268 et seq.

(44). S., C. S/ Adopción, p. 1.

(45). S., C. S/ Adopción, p. 4

(46). S., C. S/ Adopción, p. 4

(47). The Art. 9 of the CRC say that: “States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place of residence”.

(48). The case is “N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas” of 12 June 2012.

(49). “N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas”, cit., p. 3

(50). “N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas”, cit., p. 5

(51). The art. 19 of “Costitución Federal” says: “Las acciones privadas de los hombres que de ningún modo ofendan al orden y a la moral pública, ni perjudiquen a un tercero, están sólo reservadas a Dios, y exentas de la autoridad de los magistrados. Ningún habitante de la Nación será obligado a hacer lo que no manda la ley, ni privado de lo que ello no prohíbe”.

(52). In order to understand the difficult issue relating to the right to health and right to religious freedom, about to “Jehovah’s Witnesses” see, M.L. Smith, “Jehovah’s Witness refusal of blood products” in Encyclopedia of bioethics, ed. S.G. Post (New York: Macmillan, 2004), p. 1341-5; see also, R. Gillon, “Refusal of potentially life-saving blood transfusions by Jehovah’s Witnesses: should doctors explain that not all JWs think it’s religiously required?”, Journal of Medical Ethics, n° 26, 2000; pp. 299-301; and, L. Elder, “Why some Jehovah’s Witnesses accept blood and conscientiously reject official Watchtower Society blood policy”, Journal of Medical Ethics, n° 26, 2000, pp. 375-380.

(53). N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas, pp. 6-7

(54). See World Health Organization, Basic Document, ed. 45, October 2006, available on http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_sp.pdf

(55). N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas, p. 9

(56). N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas, cit., pp. 11-12

(57). N.N. o D., v. s/ protección y guarda de personas, cit., p. 13

(58). The case is CSJN, P. de la S., L. del C. c/ P., G. E. s/ divorcio y tenencia, p. 140. XLIV, 10.08.2010.

(59). See CSJN, P. de la S., L. C. c / P., G. E. s / y divorcio tenencia, P. 1. About the topic of the right to child’s identity here were many doctrinal opinions: however, in the Argentine context, the problem of the child’s right to know their origins emerged only in recent years, particularly following the enactment of the “Federal Constitución” of 1994; regarding the relationship between the right to identity and the Best Interests of the Child see, F. Villamayor, “Protección jurídica del derecho a la identidad en la adopción: incidencia de la convención de los derechos del Niño”, Lecciones y Ensayos del Departamento de Publicaciones – Facultad de Derecho – Univerisdad de Buenos Aires, n° 83, 2007, pp. 292-294.

(60). On the topic of the alleged right to filiation and its legal and ethical implications, also in reference to the new techniques of artificial fertilization see M. Warnock, Making Babies: Is there a right to have children? Oxford, 2003.

(61). See CSJN, P. de la S., L. del C. c/ P., G. E. s/ divorcio y tenencia, pp. 2-3.

(62). CSJN, P. de la S., L. del C. c/ P., G. E. s/ divorcio y tenencia, cit., p. 4

(63). CSJN, P. de la S., L. del C. c/ P., G. E. s/ divorcio y tenencia, cit., p. 4. In relation to the Child’s Right to be heard, introduced by Art. 12 of CRC of 1989, See D. O’Donnell, The Right Of Children To Be Heard: Children’s right to have their views taken into account and to participate in legal and administrative proceedings, Firenze, 2009, available on http://www.juvenilejusticepanel.org/resource/items/D/a/DanielODonnellUNICEFIRCRightChildrenToBeHeardApr09EN.Pdf (access 04.12.2018); see also, G. Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child, UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, Florence, 2005. In relation to the Child’s Right to be heard during situation of emergency or war, see C. O’Kane – C. Feinstein, The Participation of Children and Young Children in Emergencies: A guide for relief agencies, Bangkok, 2007; C. Feinstein – A. Giertsen – C. O’Kane, “Children’s participation in armed conflict and post-conflict peace building”, in A Handbook of Children and Young People’s Participation, ed. B. Percy-Smith – N. Thomas, (London, Taylor & Francis, 2010), pp. 53-62; P. Ray, Children in the most difficult circumstances, in A Handbook of Children and Young People’s Participation, ed. B. Percy-Smith – N. Thomas, (London, Taylor & Francis, 2010), pp. 63-72; In relation to the Child’s Right to be heard in Latin American rural context, see S. Punch, “Youth transitions and interdependent adult-child relations in rural Bolivia”, Journal of Rural Studies, n° 2, 2002, pp. 123–133.

(64). See CSJN, P. de la S., L. del C. c/ P., G. E. s/ divorcio y tenencia, p. 5.

(65). The case is CSJN, Marteau, Alejandro Aramis s/ homicidio en concurso ideal con lesiones graves y leves dolosas, 19.03.2009.

(66). The art. 4 of the “Ley 22.787” that regulate the “Régimen Penal de la Minoridad” says that: “La imposición de pena respecto del menor a que se refiere el artículo 2º estará supeditada a los siguientes requisitos: 1º) Que previamente haya sido declarada su responsabilidad penal y la civil si correspondiere, conforme a las normas procesales. 2º) Que haya cumplido dieciocho años de edad. 3º) Que haya sido sometido a un período de tratamiento tutelar no inferior a un año, prorogable en caso necesario hasta la mayoría de edad. Una vez cumplidos estos requisitos, si las modalidades del hecho, los antecedentes del menor, el resultado del tratamiento tutelar y la impresión directa recogida por el juez hicieren necesario aplicarle una sanción, así lo resolverá, pudiendo reducirla en la forma prevista para la tentativa. Contrariamente, si fuese innecesario aplicarle sanción, lo absolverá, en cuyo caso podrá prescindir del requisito del inciso 2º”.

(67). See CSJN, Marteau, Alejandro Aramis s/ homicidio en concurso ideal con lesiones graves y leves dolosas, cit., p. 2.

(68). CSJN, Marteau, Alejandro Aramis s/ homicidio en concurso ideal con lesiones graves y leves dolosas, cit., p. 3. About the topic regarding the death penalty as mean of child rehabilitation see E. Devoto, “Readapatacion social y realidad penitenciaria argentina”, Cuadernos de Investigaciones, n° 7, 1988, pp. 1-47; with specific reference to the rehabilitation purpose of the prison in Argentina v. J. A. Buján, La cárcel argentina: Una perspectiva crítica: resocialización de la pena privativa de la libertad, sociología carceleria, doctrina y legislación, Buenos Aires, 1998; more recently see A. Autalán - V. Autalán - A.Cueto - L.Picazo - J. Suquilvide, “La finalidad de la pena en el sistema carcelario argentino”, Revista Argentina de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales, n° 2, 2005, available at http://www.sai.com.ar/metodologia/rahycs/rahycs_v3_n2_08.htm (access 04.12.2018).

(69). This article provides that “El juez deberá tomar conocimiento directo y de visu del sujeto, de la víctima y de las circunstancias del hecho en la medida requerida para cada caso”.

(70). See CSJN, Marteau, Alejandro Aramis s/ homicidio en concurso ideal con lesiones graves y leves dolosas, cit., p. 4

(71). See CSJN, Marteau, Alejandro Aramis s/ homicidio en concurso ideal con lesiones graves y leves dolosas, cit., p. 5.

(72). The Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Brazil, constituted by 11 Chapter, was published 29 September 1997. The 5th chapter dedicated to minors is divided in 7 points: A. Brazil’s International Obligations in Regard to Children; B. The Rights of the Child and Adolescent in The Domestic Sphere; C. The Right of Minors to Life and Integrity; D. Exploitation of Child Labour; E. Sexual Exploitation of Children; F. Possible Disappearances of Children; G. Conclusions and Recommendations. The text of the report is available on http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/brazil-eng/index%20-%20brazil.htm (access 04.12.2018).

(73). See Report On The Situation Of Human Rights in Brazil, Chapter V, Point G (“Conclusions and Recommendations”).

(74). On the implementation of the Inter-American Court rulings in Brazil and about the related critical, see R. Meirelles Gasp Coelho, Protecao Internacional dos Direitos Humanos: a Corte Interamericana e a Implementacao de Suas Sentencas no Brasil, Curitiba, 2007.

(75). For example in the case “Maldonado, Daniel Enrique y otros/” the judges of the Supreme Court says: “Los niños poseen los derechos que corresponden a todos los seres humanos, menores y adultos, y tienen además derechos especiales derivados de su condición, a los que corresponden deberes específicos de la familia, la sociedad y el Estado, y el reconocimiento de estos derechos constituye un imperativo jurídico de máxima jerarquía normativa, derivado de los tratados internacionales suscriptos por nuestro país, en especial la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño y el Pacto de San José de Costa Rica”. (Causa N° 1174 del 07.12.2005)

(76). In the case “García Méndez, Emilio y Musa, Laura Cristina s/” it’s specified that: Los “tribunales”, al respecto, están obligados a atender, como consideración primordial, al interés superior del niño, llevando a cabo una “supervisión adecuada” sobre todo cuando es doc-trina de esta Corte que “garantizar” los derechos humanos implica para el Estado el deber “de tomar todas las medidas necesarias para remover los obstáculos que puedan existir para que los individuos puedan disfrutar” de aquélloslo cual comprende el ejercicio del “control de convencionalidad” entre las normas jurídicas internas aplicables in concreto y los tratados internacionales enunciados en el art. 75, inciso 22, de la Constitución Nacional”. (Causa N° 7537 del 10.04.2008). About the topic of “Control de convencionalidad” see M. Carbonell, Introducción general al control de convencionalidad, Mexico City, 2013; J.C. Hitters, “Control e Constitucionalidad Y Control De Convencionalidad. Comparación (Criterios fijados por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos)”, Estudios Constitucionales, n° 2, 2009, pp. 109 et seq.; C. Nash Rojas, “Control de convencionalidad. Precisiones conceptuales y desafíos a la luz de la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano, XIX, Bogotà, 2013, pp. 489 et seq.; E. Rey Cantor, Control de convencionalidad de las leyes y derechos humanos, Mexico City, 2008. At constitutional level, the concept of control of conventionality is introduced by the Judge S. García Ramírez in the case “Myrna Mack Chang vs. Guatemala”, of 25 November 2005 and accepted by the Inter-American Court starting from the case “Almonacid Arellano y otros vs. Chile” of 26 September 2006.

(77). See S. Vannuccini, “L’efficacia delle sentenze della Corte interamericana dei diritti dell’uomo”, in: Diritti e giurisprudenza: la Corte interamericana dei diritti umani e la Corte europea di Strasburgo, ed. L. Cassetti – A. Di Stasi, C. Landa Arroyo (Napoli: Jovene, 2014), p. 118.

(78). Art.1 p. 1 of American Convention: The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.

(79). Art.2 of American Convention: Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.

(80). As is highlighted at the Art. 62 p.3 of the Convention: The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.

(81). See G. Rolla, “L’influenza delle carte sovranazionali sulla configurazione legale dei diritti e i lineamenti del sistema di giustizia costituzionale”, Politica del Diritto, n° 2-3, 2012, pp. 190-191; with an opposing view, E. Malarino, Acerca de la pretendida obligatoriedad de la jurisprudencia de los órganos interamericanos de protección de Derechos Humanos para los Tribunales Nacionales, in: K. Ambos, E. Malarino, G. Elsner (orgs.), Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos y Derecho Penal Internacional, Tomo II, Göttingen, 2011, pp. 427-428.

(82). See M. Carducci, “Il difficile confronto tra Europa e America latina su diritto giurisprudenziale e tutela multi-ordinamentale dei diritti fondamentali”, Federalismi.it, Focus - Human Rights, n° 4, 20/12/2013, p. 14-15, available on https://www.federalismi.it (access 04.12.2018)

(83). See A. Serbin, Entre Confrontacion y el diálogo. Integración regional y Diplomacia ciudadana, Siglo XXI Ediciones, Buenos Aires, 2003, which uses the expression “Diplomacia ciudadana” to highlight the growing importance of the participation of non-state actors in regional and global processes that affect Latin America, promoting the contribution of the latter on the discussions on pressing global issues of our contemporary time.

(84). The need to retrieve the subsidiary nature of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is very well felt in Latin America see M.I. del Toro Huerta, “El Principio de Subsidiariedad en el Derecho Internacional de Los Derechos Humanos con Especial Referencia al Sistema Interamericano”, in La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a Veinticinco Años de su Funcionamiento : ed. M. Becerra Ramirez (UNAM: Mexico City, 2007), pp. 22-61; E. Salgado Ledesma, “La probable inejecución de las sentencias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”, Cuestiones constitucionales, n° 26, 2012, p. 228-230.